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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
David D. Hopper*
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia courts and the General Assembly have effected sev-
eral changes in civil practice and procedure during the past
year. This article focuses on some significant developments and
interests to the general litigation attorney.
11. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Juries
The Supreme Court of Virginia has now directly addressed
the appropriate response of a trial court when a juror has been
removed by unconstitutional use of a preemptory challenge. The
defendant in Coleman v. Hogan' used two of his three preemp-
tory challenges to strike two women, one of whom, Nayamka
Thomas, was the only black woman on the jury panel.' When
the plaintiff challenged that strike as racially motivated in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution under Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,'
defendant's counsel explained that both women were students,
and he wanted to strike all three students who were on the
panel. However, he reached that decision when he only had two
strikes remaining; therefore defendant's counsel used those two
strikes to remove the women students and left the remaining
* Director, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. A.B., 1983, magna
cum laude, Harvard University; J.D., 1989, Order of the Coif, University of Virginia.
1. 254 Va. 64, 486 S.E.2d 548 (1997).
2. See id. at 548.
3. 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
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male student on the panel, "basically on the supposition that
[the women] may be more sympathetic to the female plaintiff.'
The trial court concluded those two strikes were based on the
stricken panel members' gender and therefore violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution under
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.5 The trial court then reseated
the two women, acknowledged that status as a student was a
valid basis for striking a potential juror, and advised the defen-
dant he could "strike one of them, but [not] both of them."6
Defendant then struck the male student and Thomas, the black
woman. The plaintiff again challenged the defendant's strike of
the black woman, at which point the defendant claimed that he
decided to leave the white female student on the panel because
"she was extremely soft-spoken and meek and... between the
two women, we think she'll have less of an [e]ffect on the
jury."7
The trial court then held that the defendant offered a racially
neutral reason for his second strike of Thomas.' The supreme
court granted an appeal to determine whether the trial court
properly allowed the defendant a second preemptory strike of
the reinstated juror.
Agreeing with the majority of states to consider the issue,9
the supreme court first held that the particular remedy for the
unconstitutional exercise of a preemptory challenge should be
left to the discretion of the trial court. "A number of factors,
such as the point at which the challenge to the strike is sus-
tained and the knowledge of the jurors regarding the improper
strike, affect the determination of which remedy to choose.""
4. Coleman, 254 Va. at 66, 486 S.E.2d at 548.
5. 511 U.S. 127, 145 (1994).
6. Coleman, 254 Va. at 66, 486 S.E.2d at 548.
7. Id. at 66, 486 S.E.2d at 549.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 67, 486 S.E.2d at 549 (citing Jefferson v. State, 595 So. 2d 38, 41
(Fla. 1992); Jones v. State, 683 A.2d 520, 529 (Md. 1996); Commonwealth v.
Fruchtman, 633 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Mass. 1994); Ezell v. State, 909 P.2d 68, 72 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1995); State ex rel. Curry v. Bowman, 885 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993)).
10. Id. at 67-68, 486 S.E.2d at 549-50.
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The supreme court then went on to address the status of a
reseated juror and held that "[o]nce the trial court determines
that the basis for a preemptory strike is unconstitutional, any
other reasons proffered at the same time, or subsequently,
cannot erase the discriminatory motivation underlying the orig-
inal challenge."1' The supreme court explained that the
defendant's position would allow a constitutionally proper rea-
son for a strike to "override" an unconstitutional reason if the
acceptable reason were given at a later point in time. 2 The
supreme court concluded that adopting the defendant's suggest-
ed procedure would allow a party whose use of a preemptory
challenge was contested to create successive, multiple rationales
for the strike and would improperly restrict the trial court's
ability to evaluate the legitimacy of the proffered rationales.3
B. Amendments to Pleadings
1. Variations Between Evidence and Allegations
In Smith v. Smith, 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia ana-
lyzed Virginia Code section 8.01-377,"5 which permits a trial
court to allow pleadings to be amended "at the trial of any
action" in order to promote substantial justice and in the ab-
sence of prejudice to the opposing party." The plaintiff in
Smith made her motion to amend nine days after the trial
court granted the defendant's motion to strike the evidence and
concluded the case. The supreme court held that, based upon
the plain language of the statute, the motion was too late. 7
2. Amendment to Change Defendant
In Lake v. Northern Virginia Women's Medical Center, Inc.,8
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed as an abuse of discre-
11. Id. at 68, 486 S.E.2d at 550.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. 254 Va. 99, 487 S.E.2d 212 (1997).
15. VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-377 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
16. Id.
17. Smith, 254 Va. at 106, 487 S.E.2d at 216.
18. 253 Va. 255, 483 S.E.2d 220 (1997).
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tion a trial court's denial of a motion for leave to amend to
substitute a proper corporate defendant where the plaintiff had
been misled as to the identity of the corporate defendant. 9 In
an amended motion for judgment, the plaintiff alleged that she
had suffered injuries during an abortion procedure in April
1991 at Northern Virginia Women's Medical Center, Inc. (the
Medical Center) in Fairfax, Virginia." In response, the Medical
Center and two individuals who were the sole stockholders of
the Medical Center filed grounds of defense in which they ad-
mitted the allegations of the motion for judgment identifying
the parties.21 After extensive discovery, the plaintiff nonsuited
the action and subsequently fied a new motion for judgment
against the same parties, asserting the same facts set forth in
the first amended motion for judgment.'
After the plaintiff was allowed to amend her refiled motion
for judgment in response to a demurrer, the defendants partici-
pated in discovery and pretrial proceedings without making an
express assertion that the Medical Center was not the clinic
where the plaintiff received her abortionY However, the defen-
dants later admitted they had been aware from the inception of
the original 1993 action that the plaintiffs abortion had been
performed at a clinic owned by Fairfax Square Medical Associ-
ates, Inc. (Fairfax Square), which operated another medical
clinic in Fairfax, was owned by the same individual defendants
and did business under the name "NOVA Women's Medical
Center."' Relevant discovery contained representations by the
defendants that "the Medical Center owned and operated the
clinic where [plaintiff] received her abortion and that its princi-
pals exercised administrative control over the clinic's policies
and personnel.'
A week before trial was scheduled, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss claiming for the first time that the plaintiffs abor-
tion had been performed at the Fairfax Square clinic. During
19. See id. at 262-63, 483 S.E.2d at 224.
20. See id. at 257-58, 483 S.E.2d at 221.
21. See id. at 258, 483 S.E.2d at 221.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
994
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
argument on that motion, three days before trial, the
defendants' attorney claimed that his conduct was appropriate
because the plaintiff's attorney never asked specifically who
owned the clinic in question. 6 During the hearing on the
defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiff moved to amend her
motion for judgment or, in the alternative, for a second nonsuit
without prejudiceY The trial court ruled that the case would
proceed to trial as scheduled, at which point the plaintiff admit-
ted that she had dismissed" her expert witnesses and could not
proceed to trialY At that time, on defendants' motion, the tri-
al court granted judgment for the defendants.'
The plaintiff obtained an order suspending final judgment
and filed motions to set aside the judgment, to permit amend-
ment of her pleadings, and to have the trial court consider
imposing sanctions on the defendants and their counsel.30 At a
hearing on these post-trial motions, the trial court stated that
it was troubled by defendants' counsel's behavior, but given the
plaintiffs own failure to ascertain the true corporate ownership
of the clinic initially, and her refusal to go to trial after the
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, it denied plaintiffs
motions.3'
On appeal, the supreme court observed that although the
plaintiff had the duty to name the proper party, and although
the defendants and their counsel had no afrmative duty to
inform the plaintiff or the trial court of the plaintiffs mistake,
the defendants and their counsel were subject to the require-
ment that their pleadings and other papers be "well grounded
in fact... and.., not interposed for any improper pur-
pose."32 Thus, the defendants and their counsel had an obliga-
tion to make sure the pleadings and their behavior throughout
the case were consistent with their knowledge that the plaintiff
named the wrong corporate defendant.' The supreme court
26. See id. at 259, 483 S.E.2d at 222.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 260, 483 S.E.2d at 222.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 261, 483 S.E.2d at 223 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol.
1992)).
33. See id.
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concluded that the defendants and their counsel violated that
obligation and the plaintiffs "failure to discover [her] error in a
timely manner was occasioned by acts of the defendants, either
deliberate or careless."' Thus, although the issue of amending
pleadings is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court,
the supreme court concluded that the trial court's refusal to
allow amendment was an abuse of discretion under the circum-
stances, due to the behavior of the defendants and their coun-
sel. 5 The supreme court also remanded the case for reconsid-
eration by the trial court of its denial of the plaintiffs motion
for sanctions."6
C. Expert Witnesses
In Lawson v. Elkins,"7 the Supreme Court of Virginia exam-
ined circumstances under which a medical expert may properly
testify as to the relevant standard of care. Virginia Code section
8.01-581.20 states, in relevant part:
[a] witness shall be qualified to testify as an expert on the
standard of care if he demonstrates expert knowledge of the
standards of the defendant's specialty and of what conduct
conforms or fails to conform to those standards and if he
has had active clinical practice in either the defendant's
specialty or a related field of medicine within one year of
the date of the alleged act or omission forming the basis of
the action."
In Lawson, the plaintiff sued Dr. Robert W. Elkins, an ortho-
paedic surgeon, who she claimed had improperly prescribed a
procedure known as chemonucleolysis, during which an enzyme
is injected into a vertebral disc to shrink the disc and relieve
pressure and pain. 9 The plaintiff sought to qualify Dr. James
Jackson, a neurosurgeon, as an expert in order to testify re-
34. Id.
35. See id. at 262, 483 S.E.2d at 223.
36. See id. at 263, 483 S.E.2d at 224.
37. 252 Va. 352, 477 S.E.2d 510 (1996).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
39. See Lawson, 252 Va. at 353, 477 S.E.2d at 510.
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garding the standard of care that should have been used by
plaintiffs orthopaedic surgeon.'
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision not to
allow Dr. Jackson's qualification as an expert witness on the
defendant's specialty because Dr. Jackson had never performed
the chemonucleolysis procedure on a patient, nor had he ob-
served an actual procedure being performed.4' The supreme
court did not, however, rule that a neurosurgeon may never
render an expert opinion on the standard of care imposed upon
an orthopaedic surgeon.42
In Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach,' the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that a "human factors psychologist" improperly
testified as to matters of common experience when he opined
that the physical properties, configuration, and unsecured condi-
tion of a gate created a hazard, and that it was reasonably
foreseeable that a child could become entrapped in the gate."
In Dickerson v. Fatehi,5 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that expert testimony was not necessary when a jury could use
its own common knowledge and experience to determine negli-
gence and proximate cause where the plaintiff claimed that a
defendant neurosurgeon negligently left a hypodermic needle
inside the plaintiff after surgery.' Therefore, it was improper
for the trial court to grant summary judgment to the defen-
dants.47
On the other hand, in R.K Chevrolet v. Hayden," the
Supreme Court of Virginia found error in a trial court's refusal
to allow an accounting expert to offer an opinion that the de-
parture of a car dealership's manager caused the dealership's
lost profits." The supreme court found sufficient foundation for
the expert's opinion in the accountant's analysis of the
40. See id. at 353, 477 S.E.2d at 510-11.
41. See id. at 355, 477 S.E.2d at 511.
42. See id. at 355, 477 S.E.2d at 512.
43. 252 Va. 186, 475 S.E.2d 798 (1996).
44. See id. at 191-92, 475 S.E.2d at 801-02.
45. 253 Va. 324, 484 S.E.2d 880 (1997).
46. See id. at 326, 484 S.E.2d at 881.
47. See id. at 328, 484 S.E.2d at 881.
48. 253 Va. 50, 480 S.E.2d 477 (1997).
49. See id. at 58, 480 S.E.2d at 482.
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dealership's financial statements before and after the manager's
departure, the profits of other area dealerships, and the profits
of the general industry."
D. Remittitur
In Schwartz v. Brownlee,5 the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the application of statutory medical malpractice lia-
bility limits to a professional corporation that employed and
was owned by the individual defendant physician. 2 After the
trial court ruled as a matter of law that Dr. Schwartz was, at
all relevant times, the agent of Metropolitan Medical Care, Inc.,
(MMC), a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
against Dr. Schwartz individually and also against MMC.'
The jury awarded damages against Dr. Schwartz and MMC
jointly and severally in the amount of $1,850,000.' Pursuant
to the medical malpractice cap established by the Virginia
Code,55 the trial court ordered a remittitur of the verdict
against Dr. Schwartz5 to $1,000,000. The trial court refused,
however, to order remittitur of the verdict against MMC.
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.15 states:
In any verdict returned against a health care provider in
an action for malpractice where the act or acts of malprac-
tice occurred on or after October 1, 1983, which is tried by
a jury, or in any judgment entered against a health care
provided in an action that is tried without a jury, the total
amount recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a patient,
shall not exceed $1 million.57
Defendants conceded that MMC was not a "health care provid-
er" as defined by Virginia Code section 8.01-581.1, but argued
that because MMC was joint and severally liable for the indi-
50. See id.
51. 253 Va. 159, 482 S.E.2d 827 (1997).
52. See id. at 161, 482 S.E.2d at 828.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
56. See Schwartz, 253 Va. at 161, 482 S.E.2d at 828.
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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supreme court held that by enacting Virginia Code section 8.01-
581.15, the Virginia General Assembly plainly manifested its
intent to abrogate the common law rule of respondeat superior
in the medical malpractice context." The supreme court ex-
plained that abrogation of the common law rule in this context
was a "rule of reason" because the General Assembly's intent in
enacting the medical malpractice cap was to allow "licensed
health care providers to secure medical malpractice insurance
at affordable rates.' ° The supreme court concluded that ex-
tending the protection of the malpractice cap to non-health care
providers by the application of respondeat superior would not
serve the legislative purpose behind the cap. 9
E. Limitations
1. Actions on Notes
In Union Recovery Ltd. Partnership v. Horton," the Su-
preme Court of Virginia joined the majority of courts7 to con-
sider the issue in holding that the assignee of a promissory
note from the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was entitled
to an extension of the applicable statute of limitations under
federal law72 which favored the RTC." Thus, the supreme
court rejected the position taken by the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia in Wamco, III, Ltd. v. First
Piedmont Mortgage Corp.74
67. See id.
68. Id. at 167, 482 S.E.2d at 832 (citing Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 237 Va.
87, 93-94, 376 S.E.2d 525, 527-28 (1989)).
69. See id.
70. 252 Va. 418, 477 S.E.2d 521 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1430 (1997).
71. See id. at 423-24, 477 S.E.2d at 523-24 (citing FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805
(5th Cir. 1993)); see also Remington Invs., Inc. v. Kadenacy, 930 F. Supp. 446 (C.D.
Cal. 1996); White v. Moriarty, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Tivoli Ven-
tures, Inc. v. Bumann, 870 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1994); Twenty First Century Recovery,
Ltd. v. Mase, 665 N.E.2d 573 (IMl. Ct. App. 1996); Cadle Co. H v. Lewis, 864 P.2d
718 (Kan. 1993); Central States Resources Corp. v. First Natl Bank, 501 N.W.2d 271
(Neb. 1993).
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX14XA), (B) (1994).
73. See Union Recovery, 252 Va. at 424, 477 S.E.2d at 524.
74. 856 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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vidual doctor, who was subject to the cap, the plaintiffs total
recovery should have been limited to his allowable recovery
against Dr. Schwartz. 8
On appeal, the supreme court held that the cap did not apply
to MMC. The supreme court distinguished Bulala v. Boyd,59
which applied a single malpractice cap limit to an indivisible
injury caused by the negligence of two or more defendants, by
observing that both the defendants in Bulala were health care
providers.' The supreme court also distinguished its prior
holding in Fairfax Hospital System v. Nevitt,6 ' in which the su-
preme court observed that, for purposes of applying Virginia
Code section 8.01-35.1, which provides that the amount recov-
ered against one tort feasor shall be reduced by the amount
paid in settlement by a joint tort feasor, it was "'wholly
immaterial' that one of the tort feasors was not a health care
provider."62
Instead, the supreme court found analogous Taylor v. Mobil
Corp.,' where both a negligent physician who had allowed his
license to lapse and his employer, a non-health care provider,
claimed to be entitled to the benefit of the medical malpractice
cap.' In Taylor, the supreme court held that the trial court
erred by applying the medical malpractice cap to the verdict
because an unlicensed physician "was not a health care provid-
er within the purview of the statute."'
To escape the effect of the supreme court's holding in Taylor,
MMC argued that its only liability was derivative under the
doctrine of respondeat superior and that, under common law,
the amount of a judgment against a principal cannot exceed the
amount of the judgment against his agent.' Nevertheless, the
58. See Schwartz, 253 Va. at 164, 482 S.E.2d at 830.
59. 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990).
60. See Schwartz, 253 Va. at 165, 482 S.E.2d at 830.
61. 249 Va. 591, 457 S.E.2d 10 (1995).
62. Schwartz, 253 Va. at 165, 482 S.E.2d at 830 (quoting Fairfax Hosp. Sys. u.
Nevitt, 249 Va. 591, 598, 457 S.E.2d 10, 14 (1995)).
63. 248 Va. 101, 444 S.E.2d 705 (1994).
64. See Schwartz, 253 Va. at 165-66 482 S.E.2d at 831; Taylor, 248 Va. at 105,
444 S.E.2d at 707.
65. Schwartz, 253 Va. at 165, 482 S.E.2d at 831 (citing Taylor, 248 Va. at 109,
444 S.E.2d at 709).
66. See id. at 166, 482 S.E.2d at 831.
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2. Medical Malpractice
In St. George v. Pariser,78 the Supreme Court of Virginia
identified when an injury occurs in a medical malpractice case
based upon misdiagnosis where the plaintiff complained that
the defendant physician had failed in 1991 to diagnose a mole
as cancerous.7' Over two years later, after the cancer became
more serious, making treatment more difficult and the likeli-
hood of cure less certain,77 the plaintiff filed suit. Defendant
physician responded with a plea of the statute of limitations,
which the trial court refused to strike as a matter of law.78
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
After noting that a cause of action accrues on "the date the
injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person,"79 the
supreme court explained that in a misdiagnosis case, "the inju-
ry upon which the cause of action is based is not the original
detrimental condition; it is the injury which later occurs be-
cause of the misdiagnosis and failure to treat."0 Thus, the su-
preme court concluded that the injury occurred for purposes of
the statute of limitations at some point after the misdiagnosis,
when the plaintiffs medical condition changed from a benign
tumor to a malignant melanoma.8' Although the defendant
physician had the burden of proving the date on which the
injury was sustained with a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty, 2 the supreme court held the issue should not have
been submitted to the jury because no testimony was presented
to show when after the misdiagnosis the plaintiffs change in
condition occurred.'
75. 253 Va. 329, 484 S.E.2d 888 (1997).
76. See id. at 331, 484 S.E.2d at 889.
77. See id. at 333, 484 S.E.2d at 890-91.
78. See id. at 332, 484 S.E.2d at 889-90.
79. Id. at 332, 484 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Cuim Supp.
1997)).
80. Id. at 334, 484 S.E.2d at 891.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 332, 484 S.E.2d at 890 (citing Lo v. Burke, 249 Va. 311, 316, 455
S.E.2d 9, 12 (1995)).
83. See id. at 335, 484 S.E.2d at 891.
1997] 1001
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3. Computation of Time
In Ward v. Insurance Co. of North America,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that for statute of limitations purposes, a
"year" is to be measured as a calendar year and not a 365-day
period.85 The issue arose when Ward, the plaintiff, initiated a
contract action five calendar years after the cause of action ac-
crued.86 Ward nonsuited the action on June 10, 1994, and filed
a new motion for judgment for the same cause of action on
December 12, 1994.7 The defendants filed a special plea in
bar asserting that Ward's cause of action was barred by the
statute of limitations because an intervening leap year prevent-
ed her original motion for judgment from having been filed
within five 365-day periods from the date the cause of action
arose.8
The defendants based their argument that a year is a 365-
day period on Frey v. Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc." In Frey,
the plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment against the defendant
on November 12, 1993.90 One year and two days later, plain-
tiffs caused service to be made upon the defendant, who re-
sponded with a motion to dismiss the action as barred because
plaintiffs failed to serve the defendant within one year from the
commencement of the action." On appeal, the plaintiffs in
Frey argued that because the clerk's office had been closed on
Friday, November 11, 1994, and did not reopen until Monday,
November 14, 1994, they were entitled to the statutory exten-
sion of time provided by Virginia Code section 1-13.3:1.92 The
supreme court in Frey agreed, holding that Rule 3:3 effectively
fixes the 365th day after the commencement of the action as
the last day for the motion for judgment to be served or deliv-
84. 253 Va. 232, 482 S.E.2d 795 (1997).
85. See id. at 235, 482 S.E.2d at 797.
86. See id. at 233, 482 S.E.2d 795-96; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (Repl.
Vol. 1992).
87. See Ward, 253 Va. at 233, 482 S.E.2d at 796.
88. See id. at 234, 482 S.E.2d at 796.
89. 251 Va. 375, 467 S.E.2d 788 (1996).
90. See id. at 377, 467 S.E.2d at 789.
91. See Ward, 253 Va. at 235, 482 S.E.2d at 797 (citing Frey, 251 Va. at 378-79,
467 S.E.2d at 790); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:3.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
1002 [Vol. 31:991
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ered, thereby subjecting the one-year period of Rule 3:3 to the
saving provision in Code section 1-13.3:1.
3
In Ward, the supreme court explained that the defendants
misinterpreted Frey and observed that an interpretation of the
word "year" as equivalent to 365 days ignores the fact that a
leap year contains 366 days.' Moreover, the defendants' inter-
pretation of Frey ignored the definition of year contained in
Virginia Code section 1-13.33,"5 which states, "unless otherwise
expressed, the word 'year' shall be construed to mean a calen-
dar year."96 Accordingly, the supreme court held in Ward that
for statute of limitation purposes, a year is a calendar year and
not a 365-day period."
4. Tolling
In Swann v. Marks,98 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a suit filed against a decedent's estate was a nullity be-
cause Virginia statutes authorize an action only against a
decedent's personal representative and not directly against an
estate." Thus, the supreme court concluded that a suit against
an estate is a nullity and therefore cannot toll the statute oflimitations.'°
The supreme court also concluded that the substitution of a
personal representative for the estate as the named defendant
cannot be considered a correction of a misnomer.10 The su-
preme court stated that a misnomer arises only when the right
person is incorrectly named, not where the wrong defendant is
identified. 2
93. See Ward, 253 Va. at 235, 482 S.E.2d at 797 (citing Frey, 251 Va. at 378-79,
467 S.E.2d at 790).
94. See id.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.33 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
96. Id.
97. See Ward, 253 Va. at 235, 482 S.E.2d at 797.
98. 252 Va. 181, 476 S.E.2d 170 (1996).
99. See id. at 184, 476 S.E.2d at 171 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(BX2Xa),
(BX4) (Cum. Supp. 1997)).
100. See id. at 184, 476 S.E.2d at 171-72.
101. See id. at 184, 476 S.E.2d at 172.
102. See id. (citing Rockwell v. Allman, 211 Va. 560, 561, 179 S.E.2d 471, 472
(1971)).
10031997]
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F. Res Judicata
In Straessle v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,"~ the plaintiff brought
suit in state court for tortious interference with prospective con-
tractual relations." The plaintiffs claims arose out of activi-
ties which were also the subject of litigation in federal court in
Florida."5 The plaintiff's claims in the federal case were dis-
missed, although the case remained pending as to the claims of
other plaintiffs and the counterclaims of defendant.' The Vir-
ginia circuit court granted the summary judgment motion of the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's action was barred
by res judicata.' 7
On appeal, the plaintiff argued for the first time that the
dismissal order in the federal case was not a final order be-
cause it did not dispose of all claims involving all parties as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)."~ The de-
fendant objected to the Supreme Court of Virginia entertaining
the argument on appeal because of plaintiffs conceded failure
to raise the issue below.0 9 Nevertheless, the supreme court
held that Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25, which requires
objections to be "stated with reasonable certainty at the time of
the ruling, except for due cause shown or to enable this Court
to attain the ends of justice,""0 could not be used to force the
supreme court to grant full faith and credit to an order which
was not final."' Therefore, the supreme court concluded that
because the order entered in the federal case was not a final
order, it was error for the circuit court to dismiss the plaintiffs
action on res judicata grounds."'
103. 253 Va. 349, 485 S.E.2d 387 (1997).
104. See id. at 351, 485 S.E.2d at 388.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 352, 485 S.E.2d at 389.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 353, 485 S.E.2d at 389; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
109. See Straessle, 253 Va. at 354, 485 S.E.2d at 390.
110. Id. (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25).
111. See id.
112. See id.
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G. Motions to Strike
In Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson v. Lake Fairfax
Seven Ltd. Partnership,"' the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to strike
evidence at the conclusion of opening statements." The issue
arose in a suit by a law firm to collect legal fees from a former
client." '5 At a pretrial conference in the case, the trial court
entered an order requiring the parties to identify expert wit-
nesses at least ninety days before trial."' On the morning of
trial, after opening statements, defendants' counsel moved to
strike the plaintiffs evidence on the ground that the plaintiff,
having failed to comply with the pretrial order identifying ex-
perts, would be unable to present testimony to establish the
reasonableness of the fees charged."7 The trial court granted
the motion to strike and, on appeal, the supreme court stated:
We are of opinion that a trial court should not grant a
motion to strike the plaintiffs evidence before the plaintiff
has had an opportunity to present evidence in support of
the allegations in the motion for judgment. Indeed, we have
stated on several occasions that we disapprove the grant of
motions which "short circuit" the legal process thereby de-
priving a litigant of his day in court and depriving this
Court of an opportunity to review a thoroughly developed
record on appeal."
According to the rule announced in Tazewell Oil Co. v. Unit-
ed Virginia Bank,"9 expert testimony is not required in every
case to prove the reasonableness of attorney's fees" and
therefore, the trial court in Seyfarth should have allowed plain-
tiff to present its evidence, which would have been sufficient to
113. 253 Va. 93, 480 S.E.2d 471 (1997).
114. See id. at 95, 480 S.E.2d at 472.
115. See id. at 94, 480 S.E.2d at 471.
116. See id. at 95, 480 S.E.2d at 472.
117. See id.
118. Id. (citing Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 139-40, 427 S.E.2d 189, 192
(1993); CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 24, 431 S.E.2d 277,
279 (1993); Renner v. Stafford, 245 Va. 351, 353, 429 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1993)).
119. 243 Va. 94, 413 S.E.2d 611 (1992).
120. See Seyfarth, 253 Va. at 96, 480 S.E.2d at 473.
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go to the jury. That evidence would have included testimony
from an attorney at the firm about the nature of the legal ser-
vices, the complexity of the services, and the value of those
services.' In addition, the attorney would have testified that
the services were necessary and appropriate, and that the fees
incurred were fees ordinarily charged in similar types of legal
representation." Such evidence would have been sufficient for
a fact finder to infer that the law firm's fees were reasonable,
even in the absence of expert testimony."
H. Evidence
1. Accident Reports
In Cherry v. D.S. Nash Construction Co., M the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a statute barring the introduction
into evidence of an accident report" does not also bar the in-
troduction of otherwise admissible evidence contained in the re-
port.1' In Cherry, a statement contained in a policeman's field
notes was admissible in evidence, although the official accident
report into which they were incorporated was not admissible
under the statute.
21
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court cited the hold-
ings of Moore v. Warren" and Galbraith v. Fleming" to
illustrate the distinction between admissible and inadmissible
evidence. In Moore, the supreme court held that admission of a
diagram made by an investigating officer was not barred by the
predecessor statute to Virginia Code section 46.2-379, although
the diagram was identical to one included in the accident re-
port.30 On the other hand, in Galbraith, the supreme court
121. See id. at 97, 480 S.E.2d at 473.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. 252 Va. 241, 475 S.E.2d 794 (1996).
125. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-379 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1997) ("All
(motor vehicle] accident reports made by investigating officers ... shall not be used
as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of any accident.").
126. See Cherry, 252 Va. at 245, 475 S.E.2d at 797.
127. See id. at 245-46, 475 S.E.2d at 797.
128. 203 Va. 117, 122 S.E.2d 879 (1961).
129. 245 Va. 173, 427 S.E.2d 187 (1993).
130. See Cherry, 252 Va. at 245, 475 S.E.2d at 797 (citing Moore, 203 Va. at 124,
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held inadmissible a portion of an accident report containing the
actual diagram made by the investigating officer, even though
the jury was not informed that the diagram was part of a re-
port. 3' The supreme court explained that this distinction is
based upon the danger that a jury could attach more weight to
an official report simply because of its official nature.3 2 Thus,
the supreme court concluded that Virginia Code section 46.2-
379 bars any use of the actual accident report itself."
2. Treatises
In Weinberg v. Given,"' the Supreme Court of Virginia not-
ed that Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1 provides, in certain cir-
cumstances, that "statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine or
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by testi-
mony or by stipulation shall not be excluded as hearsay.""
Therefore, a factfinder is permitted to consider articles relied
upon by experts as substantive evidence so long as no other
evidentiary rule would bar their admission.3 8'
3. Use of Depositions on Summary Judgment
In Gay v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.,"17 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a plaintiffs deposition was not prop-
erly used as a basis for entry of summary judgment absent
evidence that he agreed to its use as contemplated by Virginia
Code section 8.01-420 and Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3:18,
even though he failed to raise his objection until after the mo-
tion for summary judgment was made, briefed and argued."
122 S.E.2d at 885).
131. See id. (citing Galbraith, 245 Va. at 174-75, 427 S.E.2d at 188).
132. See id. at 246, 475 S.E.2d at 797 (citing Davis v. Colgin, 219 Va. 5, 7, 244
S.E.2d 750, 751 (1978)).
133. See id. at 245, 475 S.E.2d at 797.
134. 252 Va. 221, 476 S.E.2d 502 (1996).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
136. See Weinberg, 252 Va. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 504.
137. 253 Va. 212, 483 S.E.2d 216 (1997).
138. See id. at 214, 483 S.E.2d at 218. Virginia Code section 8.01-420 and Virginia
Supreme Court Rule 3:18 specifically require the parties to agree to the use of depo-
sitions before they may serve as the basis for summary judgment. VA. CODE ANN. §
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The supreme court observed, however, "that the better practice
would have been for [Plaintiff] to have made his objection
known earlier in the proceedings."' 9
III. RECENT LEGISLATION AFFECTING CIVIL PRACTICE
The General Assembly enacted several measures during the
1997 session which affect civil litigation in state courts.14 For
ease of reference, the discussion of these enactments is classi-
fied by subject matter.
A. Jurisdiction
The maximum jurisdictional amount for General District
Courts has been raised to $15,000. Additionally, upon removal
or appeal to circuit court by the defendant, the circuit court
may permit a plaintiffs claim to be increased above the $15,000
limit.'4'
B. Venue
The statute governing venue for suits on certain construction
contracts in the Commonwealth was amended to provide for
venue "where the construction project is located, or such other
jurisdiction where the venue is proper under the provisions of
this chapter."4
2
8.01-420 (Repl. Vol. 1992); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:18.
139. See Gay, 253 Va. at 214, 483 S.E.2d at 218.
140. Unless otherwise indicated, all provisions discussed herein became effective on
July 1, 1997.
141. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-77, -114.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997). The statute formerly pro-
vided that "a cause of action arising under such contract may be brought in the juris-
diction where the work is to be performed, notwithstanding any contract provision to
the contrary." Id. § 8.01-262.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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C. Immunity
1. Emergency Care Providers
The statute governing immunity to those providing emergen-
cy care has been amended to include a grant of immunity for
physicians serving without compensation as medical advisors to
E-911 systems, where medical advice is rendered in good
faith.' The statute was also amended to grant immunity to
telecommunication service providers from liability for acts or
omissions in connection with rendering such services related to
emergency calls in the absence of gross negligence or willful
misconduct.'"
2. Church Members
A new statute grants immunity from liability in tort or con-
tract to members of religious bodies for the actions of officers,
employees, leaders, or other members of the religious body.
However, the statute is not intended to "prevent any person
from being held liable for his own actions."45
3. Architects
Architects who act in good faith and without compensation in
providing rescue or relief assistance in connection with disas-
ters or other life-threatening emergencies have been granted
immunity from civil damages in the absence of gross negligence
or willful misconduct.'
4. Teachers
A new statute grants teachers employed by local school
boards immunity from civil damages in the absence of gross
143. See id. § 8.01-225(BX1) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
144. See id. § 8.01-225(BX2) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
145. Id. § 8.01-220.1:3 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
146. See id. § 8.01-226.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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negligence or willful misconduct for acts or omissions resulting
from the supervision, care or discipline of students, so long as
the acts or omissions are within the teacher's scope of employ-
ment and are taken in good faith.'47
D. Interest on Judgments
Virginia Code section 8.01-382 has been modified to provide
that a judgment entered on a negotiable instrument will accrue
interest on the principal amount at the rate specified in the
instrument or, if no rate is specified, at the judgment rate,
notwithstanding the other provisions of the section governing
interest."
E. Evidence
1. Medical Expenses
The statute governing authenticity and reasonableness of
medical bills has been amended to provide that, in actions for
personal injuries, wrongful death, or for medical expense bene-
fits payable under a motor vehicle insurance policy, where no
medical bill has been rendered or specific charge made by a
health care provider to the insured, an insurer, or any other
person, "the usual and customary fee charged for the service
rendered may be established by the testimony or the affidavit
of an expert having knowledge of the usual and customary fees
charged for the services rendered.'
If an affidavit is used, it must be submitted to the opposing
party at least twenty-one days prior to trial. 50 The testimony
or affidavit is subject to rebuttal and "may be admitted in the
same manner as an original bill or authenticated copy as de-
scribed in subsection A of the statute." 5'
147. See id. § 8.01-220.1:2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
148. See id. § 8.01-382 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
149. Id. § 8.01-413.01(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
150. See id. § 8.01-413.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
151. Id. § 8.01-413.01(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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2. Determination of Employment Status
A new statute makes clear that a final, unappealed order
entered by a Virginia circuit court which determines that a
person "is or is not an employee of another for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction" will estop either party from asserting
otherwise in a subsequent action between the parties on the
same claim or cause of action.
152
F. Limitations
The statute governing accrual of causes of action based on
sexual abuse during infancy or incompetency has been amended
to provide for accrual upon removal of the disability of infancy
or incompetency."5 If the fact of injury and its causal connec-
tion to sexual abuse is not known upon the removal of the
disability, a cause of action will accrue when that information
is communicated to the plaintiff by a licensed physician, psy-
chologist, or clinical psychologist."M
G. Service of Process
1. Service by Private Person
The Virginia Code section governing who may serve process
has been amended to clarify that, although private persons may
serve process generally, they may not serve writs of possession
or capias and may not levy upon property.'55
2. Service Outside the Commonwealth
The statute governing personal service outside the Common-
wealth has been amended to provide that personal service on a
152. See id § 8.01420.5 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
153. See id. § 8.01-249(6) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
154. See id. Formerly, a cause of action based upon sexual abuse accrued only
when the information was communicated to the plaintiff by a licensed physician,
psychologist or clinical psychologist. See id. § 8.01-249(6) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
155. See id. § 8.01-293(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
101119971
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:991
non-resident outside the Commonwealth is the equivalent of
personal service on a non-resident within the Commonwealth,
so long as the court would have personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident under the long-arm statute.'"
3. Juries
The General Assembly has added to the list of persons who
may claim exemption from jury service "[a]ny person who is the
only person performing services for a business, commercial or
agricultural enterprise and whose services are so essential to
the operations of the business, commercial or agricultural enter-
prise that such enterprise must close or cease to function if
such person is required to perform jury duty."'57
H. Collections
1. Penalty for Serving Notice of Lien Without Reasonable Basis
A new Virginia Code section provides a $100 civil penalty for
any notice of lien wrongfully served on a financial institution
without "a reasonable basis for believing that the judgment
debtor is entitled to a payment from such institution."" The
statute also provides that a financial institution's location in an
area where the judgment debtor resides, works, or has a place
of business is not, standing alone, a reasonable basis for believ-
ing that the judgment debtor is entitled to a payment from the
financial institution.'59 In any action to recover under the new
statute, the judgment creditor or attorney causing the notice of
lien to be served has the burden of showing the reasonable
basis for believing the judgment debtor was entitled to a pay-
ment from the financial institution bringing suit."
156. See id. § 8.01-320(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997); see also id. § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol.
1992).
157. Id. § 8.01-341.1(12) (Cure. Supp. 1997).
158. Id. § 8.01-502.1 (Cure. Supp. 1997).
159. See id.
160. See id.
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2. Service of Garnishment Summons
Judgment creditors may no longer serve garnishment sum-
mons on the corporate garnishee's officers or managing employ-
ees. Instead, all garnishment summons must now be served
upon the corporation's registered agent or upon the clerk of the
State Corporation Commission as otherwise provided by
law.1
61
I. Striking Cases from the Docket
The statute governing removal of stale cases from the docket
has been amended to provide that cases pending for more than
three years where there has been no order or proceeding except
a continuance, may be discontinued without notice to the par-.
ties, but may be reinstated on motion for cause within one year
after an order of discontinuance has been entered.'62
161. See id. § 8.01-513 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
162. See id. § 8.01-335(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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